Avrupa merkezci siyasetin aşırılıkları Almanya’da güven kaybı ve yatırım atmosferinde belirsizlik yaratıyor

Kısaca

Olay ve somut rakam/isimler: Merz’in liderliğindeki CDU’nun seçim kaybı ve popülarite düşüşü; AfD’nin yükselişi Kurumsal arka plan: Merz döneminde merkez siyasetinin güvenilirliğine dair soruların artması Piyasa/iş dünyası sonucu ve izlenecek nokta: Yatırımcı güveninin zayıflaması ve siyasi belirsizliğin piyasalarda etkisi bekleniyor

Ana mesele

Avrupa merkezci siyasetin aşırılıkları, Almanya’da güven kaybı ve ekonomik gerilemeyi tetikliyor

Ne değişti?

Merkezci söylem çöküşünün oy verme davranışlarına yansıması artıyor

Beni nasıl etkiler?

Okuyucular için yatırım güveni ve piyasa istikrarında dalgalanma riskingir

Ne oldu?

Alman merkezci siyasetin aşırılıkları nedeniyle Merz’in liderliğindeki CDU’nun seçimlerde kayıpları ve popülarite düşüşleri büyüyor.

Neden şimdi?

Üç on yıllık moderaatçılık imajı çöktü; kemer sıkma politikaları ve deindustrializasyon eleştirileri güç kazanıyor.

Neden önemli?

İç politika istikrarı, yatırımcı güvenini ve Avrupa’daki ekonomik güvenliği direkt etkiler.

Kimler etkileniyor?

• Alman iş dünyası ve yatırımcılar
• Avrupa politikalarıyla etkileşimde olan uluslararası tedarik zincirleri

Sektör ve piyasa etkisi

Alman sanayi ve genelde Avrupa borsalarında dikkatli davranış baskısı artabilir

Riskler

• Piyasalarda artan volatilite
• Güven kaybının yatırım akışlarını olumsuz etkilemesi
• ABD-AB ilişkilerinde olası gerilimler

Takip edilmesi gerekenler

• Merz’in politika mesajlarının değişimi
• AfD’nin seçim stratejilerindeki gelişmeler
• Avrupa’da maliye politikalarına yönelik yeni sinyaller

Haberin tamamı

x whatsapp-stroke copylink google Add Al Jazeera on Google info German Chancellor Friedrich Merz leaves after a news conference in Berlin, Germany on September 21, 2026 [Fabrizio Bensch/Reuters] Friedrich Merz has been German chancellor for less than a year and half, and his approval ratings are at record lows. His centre-right Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), which just lost one state election and was obliterated in another, is in free fall across the country.

The German media cannot talk or write about anything else, blaming Merz for weak campaigning, for boxing himself into an unpopular coalition with the social democrats, for failing to energise the youth as the ultraright Alternative for Germany (AfD) has. All true, all secondary.

What is actually dying in Germany is not just a hitherto dominant party, but the image of centrist politicians as moderate technocrats. After three decades of this facade of moderation and competence, it is now becoming clear that they were neither moderate nor competent.

Alas, first gradually, then suddenly, the masks are falling to the ground, and now the majority can see them for what they have always been: Zealots ruthlessly pursuing dead-end, misanthropic policies that have gutted German society’s capacity to sustain itself and brought it to the verge of an unnecessary war on European soil.

Zealotry dressed in a grey suit and speaking in a soothing voice, repeating ad nauseam that “there is no alternative,” doesn’t look like zealotry until it starts to fail at an epic scale. What changed recently, with inevitable repercussions at the ballot box, is that the deindustrialisation and stagnation caused by the centrists’ extremism has become impossible to ignore.

The AfD did not surge because, overnight, millions of Germans had an epiphany that made them more susceptible to fascist tropes. Its ranks swelled because years of austerity made the German people stare in the face of a loss of status and a high probability of real poverty. Is it any wonder that the ultra-right succeeded in creating an electoral tsunami out of the longing for a return to a fictional golden past – a past lacking the “suspicious” stranger: The Muslim, the Jew, the trans?

It is the same story from Berlin to Paris to London. French President Emmanuel Macron’s centrism has single-handedly pushed France to the edge of a far-right presidency. He made promises of a French renaissance that is impossible, given the shackles of the monetary union with Germany that lacks the necessary democratic and political union.

He has piled tax breaks on the ultra-rich few at a time when the many have struggled to pay for the petrol that their cars need to get them to work. He has raised the retirement age to 64 at a time when impoverished workers’ life expectancy is no more than 72 years.

He has never seen a rent-seeking banker that he has not warmed up to. And all along, he has countenanced no deviation, no compromise, no democratic argument about alternatives.

In the United Kingdom, the centrist Tory-Labour duopoly has also embraced the same austerity policies. In the 1980s, Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s wanton vandalism of British industry and her financialisation of homes and utilities made the UK a cesspit of mind-numbing inequality, with a burgeoning import-based service economy and real estate spivs living parasitically at the expense of the vast, disenfranchised majority.

However, it was Tony Blair’s Labour government that sealed this victory of Britain’s oligarchic rentier class by devising innovative ways to continue the gutting of public goods, while completing the unshackling of the City of London bankers. Naturally, as in Germany and France, the politics of fear and loathing are on the march in the UK.

Everywhere, it is the same mechanism: Parties that called themselves sensible, pragmatic, and centrist have pursued one of the most doctrinaire economic programmes in European history – and pursued it with a rigidity, an intolerance of dissent, and a contempt for democratic contestation that the actual political extremes of the 20th century would have recognised as their own method, even if they had rejected the content.

I want to be precise about what I mean by extremism here, because it is not a rhetorical flourish. An ideology is extreme not so much because of where it sits on a left-right spectrum, not even because of the extreme impact of its policies on the majority, but because of how it treats disagreement: As illegitimate, as a problem to be managed rather than a proposition to be responded to.

By that test, Europe’s centre has been the most extreme political formation since the end of World War II. It has built a currency union explicitly designed to remove economic policy from the reach of elections. It has enabled electricity cartels to rob people and businesses blind. It has labelled anyone proposing an alternative “unserious”, “populist” or “anti-European” – regardless of whether that alternative makes economic sense.

In 2015, as the minister of finance of Greece, I had the privilege of experiencing in person the European centrists’ casual extremism. After five years of a failed stabilisation programme that cost Europeans more than an annual Greek gross domestic product, the people of Greece voted for Syriza, which I was a member of, in January 2015 to renegotiate financial terms that even bankers admitted were ludicrous.

And how did the centre respond? They crushed us. Not because they disagreed with our proposals but because, as Christine Lagarde, then the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, put it to me, they had put so much political capital into the Greek programme that they could not go back.

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Kaynaklar

• Al Jazeera - English