ABD yaptırımları karşısında Pekin’in dengeleme stratejisi küresel ekonomi için yeni dinamikler mi getiriyor

Kısaca

Küresel tedarik zincirleri ve finansal piyasalar üzerinde olası etkiler için dikkat çin ve ameri̇ka arasındaki baskı dengelerini değiştirebilecek adımların sinyalleri piyasa ve politika kararları için takip noktaları: açıklamalar ve düzenleyici yönler

Ana mesele

Beijing, Washington’un yaptırım mekanizmasını nötralize etme stratejisini sürdürüyor

Ne değişti?

Çin’in baskıya karşı stratejisinin küresel ticari dengeyi değiştirebileceği netleşiyor

Beni nasıl etkiler?

Okuyucuya etkisi: küresel ticaret ve yatırım belirsizlikleri artabilir

Ne oldu?

Beijing, Washington’ın yaptırımlarına karşı küresel ekonomik düzeni etkileyecek denge stratejileri üzerinde hareket ediyor

Neden şimdi?

Güçlü bir küresel ticaret blokunun oluşmaya başlaması ve ABD’nin baskılarının artması bağlamında

Neden önemli?

Pazarlar ve yatırımcılar için belirsizlikleri yönetmede yeni araçlar ve iletişim stratejileri gerektiriyor

Kimler etkileniyor?

• Uluslararası şirketler ve finansal kurumlar
• Gelişen piyasa ekonomileri

Sektör ve piyasa etkisi

İlgili sektörlerde volatilite artabilir; yatırım akışları ve risk iştahı değişebilir

Riskler

• Kamu politikası belirsizliği
• dolar bazında borçlanma maliyetlerinde artış
• ticaret rotalarında yeniden yönlendirme gerekliliği

Takip edilmesi gerekenler

• Çin’in karşı tedbir adımları ve açıklamaları
• ABD ve müttefiklerinin yeni yaptırım yaklaşımları
• uluslararası kurumların tepkileri
• piyasa tepkileri ve sermaye akışları

Haberin tamamı

Last week, the president of the United States stood at the podium of the United Nations General Assembly and asked aloud whether he should “annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly”. Donald Trump then turned to Venezuela’s oil and declared: “To the victor belong the spoils, you’ve all heard that …”

He spoke as the Iran war neared its eighth month, a week after the UN Human Rights Council found “reasonable grounds to believe” that the US had committed war crimes. In the same speech, Trump said the United States would not join global regulation of AI and urged countries to abandon the International Criminal Court.

Elsewhere this month, the picture looked very different. In Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, all 10 member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) gathered to mark its 25th anniversary. The bloc began in 2001 as a club of six. This year’s summit produced 27 documents alongside the Bishkek Declaration, which condemned the military strikes on Iranian territory by the US and Israel as violations of international law.

The Bishkek summit stopped short of launching the proposed SCO Development Bank, even though the bloc had agreed to create it a year earlier.

Days later in New Delhi, the 11 Brics members unanimously adopted the New Delhi Declaration. The consensus document called for “maximum restraint” in the Middle East and criticised unilateral sanctions not authorised by the UN Security Council. It also took aim at the global trade war without naming the US. The host, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, urged the Global South to become a “rule shaper” rather than simply accept rules set elsewhere.

Brics’ emergence as a powerful non-Western bloc, said Allen Carlson, a political scientist and Chinese foreign policy expert at Cornell University, highlights how the balance of global power has changed over the past two decades. “Brics is no longer an incipient power bloc but the core of the emerging international order, with China at its centre … President Trump and his advisers clearly think the world still revolves around Washington, but this no longer holds true,” he said.

“This is as much a result of American self-inflicted wounds as of Xi’s skill at home and abroad … But for better or worse, there appears to be a new sheriff in town.”

China sits at the centre of this architecture, and its financial pillar is now substantial. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), launched in 2016 over Washington’s objections, has grown to 111 approved members. In its first decade, it approved nearly US$70 billion for 361 projects across 40 member states. Its members include every AAA-rated sovereign except Liechtenstein, as well as 17 of the G20 countries.

The Iran war has also tested China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), which reported that its daily average transaction volume reached US$134 billion in March. Iran has charged ships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz and accepted payment either in yuan, routed through the Bank of Kunlun via CIPS and outside Swift, or in cryptocurrency. Such channels undermine a pillar of dollar dominance: the power of financial sanctions.

Other middle powers are hedging. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said his country would consider full SCO membership while keeping its Nato and Western ties. United Arab Emirates officials have reportedly said they may need to use the renminbi for oil payments. As the economist Paul Krugman has observed, the Gulf states’ actions show that even US allies are now considering the Chinese payment system.

The dollar remains dominant, but the threat of US sanctions loses force once a workable alternative exists

This is less a story of Beijing’s pull than of Washington’s push. The dollar remains dominant, but the threat of US sanctions loses force once a workable alternative exists.

In a recent Substack column, Krugman argues that the rise of alternative payment systems, sharply accelerated by the Iran war, has seriously damaged the dollar’s supremacy as the foremost instrument of America’s global financial power. What has been lost is a non-military tool of coercion: the power to punish that the dollar’s dominance in international finance gave the United States.

As Krugman explains, transactions in dollars normally pass through US banks, so US authorities can see them and block them. That is how Washington has been able to cut nations off from the world economy, most notably through years of sanctions on Iran.

That power, he contends, is now diminished. Trump’s war has shown other nations that they can bypass the dollar-based payments system, largely thanks to China. In Krugman’s reading, the US has suffered a financial failure as well as a military one. Beijing has used the war to strengthen an alternative system that lets governments at odds with America evade both US surveillance and US sanctions. Settling in yuan lets those Washington calls rogue actors slip beneath its financial radar.

The war has been an object lesson in the yuan’s value as an alternative currency. It has also boosted CIPS as a rival to Swift, the Belgium-based but effectively US-controlled network that still handles most international transactions.

For Hong Kong, the stakes are practical. The city is home to the renminbi Clearing House Automated Transfer System (CHATS), the offshore yuan clearing system linked to CIPS, and has always thrived by connecting rival systems rather than choosing between them.

Many commentators like to point out the authoritarian streak that Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping share. But as the two stood together at the White House last week, it was clear they represented opposing principles: multilateralism versus unilateralism, consensus versus domination.

The country that insists on leading should not be the one that threatens loudest. We all know which country that is.

Kaynaklar

• South China Morning Post - Business